Volume 66

Issue 3

Article 6

April 1964

Conflict of Laws--Law Governing Testamentary Trusts Involving
Movables
George Charles Hughes III
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, and the Estates and Trusts Commons

Recommended Citation
George C. Hughes III, Conflict of Laws--Law Governing Testamentary Trusts Involving Movables, 66 W. Va.
L. Rev. (1964).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol66/iss3/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Hughes: Conflict of Laws--Law Governing Testamentary Trusts Involving Mov

CASE COMMENTS

Conflict of Laws--Law Governing Testamentary
Trusts Involving Movables
Ps, trustees of testamentary trust, brought suit for a declaratory
judgment construing the will and setting forth their duties under
the will. The lower court entered judgment providing in part that
establishment, maintenance, and operation of certain clinic-hospitals
as described in the will in Texas would violate Texas law but
further decreed that board of trustees was authorized to carry out
the clinic-hospital provisions in California, and the Texas Attorney
General appealed. Held, reversed. Testamentary trust which had
its situs in Texas, was composed of property located in Texas, was
established by testator residing in Texas and which was to be
managed by trustees residing in Texas, must be governed by Texas
law. The appellate court instructed the trustees to disregard the
provisions concerning the establishment and maintenance of the
hospitals not only in Texas but also in California. Wilson v. Smith,
373 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
The principal case presents the interesting question of what law
should govern testamentary trusts involving personal property where
multi-state contacts are involved. The problem largely stems from
the difficulty of determining which of the many and varied factors
usually present should be controlling.
The general rule is that, as applied to testamentary trusts involving tangible movable property, the law of the testator's domocile
governs. This is the prevailing view throughout the various jurisdictions of this country. Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636
(1894); Hussey v. Sargent, 116 Ky. 53, 75 S.W. 211 (1903);
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 159 (3d ed. 1949);

RESTATEMENT,

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 298 (1934). Various reasons have been
advanced for this rule, but none seems to be more satisfactory
than that the testator is presumed to be familiar with the laws of his
domocile; to have prepared his will in the light of those laws, and to
apply any other law would be at the great risk of defeating his intent,
unless it is manifest that the testator had the laws of some other
place, or country, in mind. In re Chappell, 124 Wash. 128, 213
Pac. 684 (1923).
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Although the above rule seems to be firmly established, there is a
recent judicial trend toward its modification. Martin v. Haycock, 22
N. J. 1, 123 A.2d 223 (1956); In re Henderson, 40 N.J. Super. 297,
123 A.2d 78 (1956). Commentators, for example, urge that other
factors such as the language of the will, the implied intention of the
testator, the place of execution of the will and the domocile of the
trustee at the time the will was executed should be given serious
consideration together with the testator's domocile. LAND, TRUSTS
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 36.1 (1940); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 298 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959). In this regard,
Colorado has held that the law of the state of the testator's domocile
at the time of the execution of the will is but one circumstance, not
necessarily controlling, which aids the court of another state in
construing the will and ascertaining the intention of the testator.
Blatt v. Blatt, 243 Pac. 1099 (Colo. 1926).
In the instant case, the will in question provided for the establishment of clinic-hospitals wherein chiropractors licensed in California
would do research and study and would apply methods of nutrition,
blood chemistry, physical therapy, radionics, electricity, and other
methods of nonmedical healing for treating human illness. The
court examined the various contacts present and found that such
a provision would violate both civil and criminal statues of Texas and
would therefore be contrary to that state's public policy. Therefore,
such a provision was invalid and being invalid, was void and unenforceable everywhere. Noting the marked emphasis placed upon
the dominant contacts involved, it is submitted that this decision is
in accord with the recent thinking in this area.
There is however, a qualification to the rule set forth in the
principal case. It arises in situations where the trust violates the rule
against perpetuities of the testator's domocile, but does not violate
that of the state in which the trust is to be administered. For example,
in Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892), the will
of the testator, a resident of New York, directed his executors to
convert his New York property and pay over the proceeds to Scottish
trustees for the purpose of founding an infirmary for the care of the
sick in Scotland. The disposition was void under New York law on
the ground of indefiniteness of beneficiaries, but under the law of
Scotland it was valid. The appellate court upheld the validity of
the trust, saying that such a gift to a foreign charity is not void.
The court further said that where there is a trustee competent to
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take and hold and the trust is capable of being executed and enforced
according to the law of the place to which the property was to be
transmitted under the will of the donor the disposition is perfectly
valid. This decision represents the majority view in this area in refusing to upset a charitable trust which does not offend the policy
of the state of domocile. Cavers, TRUSTS INTER VIVOS AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 44 HARv. L. REv. 161, 167 (1931).
The West Virginia court has never decided the precise question
raised by the principal case. It did however, approach the problem
in American Bible Soc'y v. Pendleton, 7 W.Va. 79 (1873). In that
case M, living in Virginia, made a deed conveying land in Pennsylvania to P to be sold, directing that the proceeds of the sale should
be held by P subject to the written order of the grantor. Subsequently
M made a will disposing of the proceeds of the land, which will
was admitted to probate in Virginia. The court held that the validity
of any bequest of the proceeds of the land must be determined by the
laws of Virginia in force when the will took effect. This decision
would seem to favor the orthodox rule enunciated earlier.
In conclusion then, we may say that the orthodox rule is undergoing some modification. Although it is only speculation, it is submitted that West Virginia would follow this change and adopt the rule
presented by the principal case.
George CharlesHughes, III
Conflict of Laws-Appointment of a
Valid Agent for Service of Process
Ds leased two incubators from P, a corporate lessor with its
principal place of business in New York City. The lease was a form
lease signed in Michigan designating the wife of one of the corporate
lessor's officers as agent for the purpose of accepting service of any
process within the State of New York. The form lease was less than
one and a half pages long and the clause designating the agent to accept the service of process was just above the signatures of Ds. The
above clause in no way stated that the designated agent was obligated, or had duty to give notice to Ds if service of process was
served. P later sued Ds in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York for an alleged default of the payments
of the lease. The agent, upon receipt of service of process from the
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